What is an ETT?

Most of my posts so far have been about what we've done over here. I realized recently that this is all well and good, but I haven't really explained who we are and what we're doing besides basics. So for those of you expecting a post about the daring-do of our ETT Team, be forewarned, this is a history lesson and the actual mechanics of an ETT. N'Shallah, I will write more about my experiences soon.

Before coming over to Afghanistan, I did a fair amount of research on what is an ETT and what an ETT does. From what I found, everyone's experiences are different. No one does the same thing and that's sort of the point. First ETT stands for "Embedded Training Team." It's the military's idea of fusing host nation forces together with a team of Americans who will help train, advise and then go on missions with them.

The history of ETT is an interesting one. Traditionally, an ETT mission was done by someone like this...



Yes, that's John Wayne from the movie, "The Green Berets." Traditional "ETT" missions were performed by Special Forces in Vietnam. The concept was simple: Drop into a village somewhere, train the locals to fight the communists, advise them on how to better their lives and then go out and fight alongside of them. It was a good concept and the Special Forces community had a great deal of success especially with the Montegnard tribe in Vietnam. With the implementation of conventional forces into Vietnam after 1965, the U.S. military took on the brunt of fighting in effect sidelining local fighters. After conventional U.S. forces entered Vietnam, most of the counter-insurgency fight was done by conventional military forces. However, the Marines instituted a program known as the "Combined Action Program" that embedded U.S. Marines with South Vietnamese units.



This program had a fair amount of success but was strongly resisted by those who favored fighting the communist insurgency through large-scale battles fought over vast swaths of land. The communists did not comply. Instead, they fought where they chose and while never quite winning a tactical victory against the United States, they won in the court of public opinion. The battle was for something greater than "body counts." It was a battle for something more abstract: the support of the population. It was something that U.S. commanders realized far too late to have any real impact.

This brings us to the "Global War on Terrorism" or "Global contingency on Terrorism" or whatever it's being called now. I'll stick with the label "war" for the time being as it most accurately reflects events on the ground. Initially, small units of Special Forces soldiers operating with the Northern Alliance utilizing superior firepower and small-unit fundamentals defeated a much larger, better-equipped force of Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters. Within 6 weeks, 80% of Afghanistan was held by pro-U.S. forces. Special Forces soldiers went to battle like this


This was one of the most successful uses of small teams of U.S. forces embedded within local national people ever achieved. However, the Taliban wasn't done. Firefights erupted across Afghanistan and large-scale battles were waged which cost many American and Afghan lives. I recommend the book "Not a Good Day to Die" by Sean Naylor as a good example of the vicious nature of post-invasion fighting in Afghanistan.

And then there was Iraq. Whatever the merits of the invasion, it was conducted very conventionally with an armor-heavy assault through the Iraqi army to get to Baghdad as quickly as possible. Like the communists in Vietnam, the Iraqis realized that they couldn't fight against the Americans conventionally. Soon after the invasion, anti-American Iraqis and Al-Qaeda forces began utilizing unconventional tactics - Improvised Explosive Devices planted along the sides of roads, suicide bombers, ambushes, vehicle-borne explosive devices. American forces would typically win these tactical engagements but the momentum of the insurgency continued. More Americans died. Public support for the war in Iraq waned. The insurgents seemed to take a lesson from the Viet Cong that an insurgency fight was not about winning or losing on the battlefield, it was about winning the battle for the population, a war of public opinion.

Some coalition commanders realized as much and began to fight a true counterinsurgency war in Iraq. Part of the equation in counterinsurgency was training what's known as "host-nation forces." In Iraq, they introduced Military Transition Teams (MTT - pronounced "mitt") in order to train the Iraqi army and police to take responsibility for their own country. Eventually, MTT teams trained over 300,000 Iraqi police and soldiers. Part of the success story of MTT teams can be seen in the Battle of Basra (2008) where Iraqi army and police (with American MTT support) defeated Moqtada Al Sadr's Mahdi army. MTT teams continue to work in Iraq.

Afghanistan seemed peaceful in contrast to Iraq for a while. Eventually, the Taliban regrouped a bit and was out and about fighting an insurgency. American casualties increased (and still are increasing) in Afghanistan. The Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police were in need of some serious training and mentoring. That's where we come in.

First, for those who might be reading this for the first time, here's what we're not. We're not Special Forces. We don't have super-human strength. None of us have been to Afghanistan before. Here's what we are: National Guard soldiers, most of the guys in my team are in their late 20s or early 30s, my guys are Field Artillery guys (I have an infantry background), street smart, lots of military experience (whether in the Guard or the active duty time). These are the kinds of people that you want for a mission like this.

Our mission here is to advise an ANA Kandak (equivalent of a battalion). When I say advise, I should probably also mention the word "mentor." Mentorship is the name of the game. Afghans look to Americans to make decisions for them. We don't and we shouldn't. We advise. We offer other options. We're the guys who say, "Have you considered..." That's us. We also don't give them supplies. One of the earliest issues we've encountered here is that the ANA always asks us for supplies. Whether it's ammo or communications equipment or vehicles, they are constantly asking for everything and anything. Our response: Use your supply chain; fill out your supply form and use it. It's frustrating to them. It's frustrating to us. We want to help them, but we also want to create the framework by which they can help themselves when we leave.

We focus on the basics. Everything we do is very basic. As an old Special Forces guy told one of my soldiers, "It's not that we have some secret skills that no one knows about. We just do the basics over and over again in order to master them." That's what we're doing. We go over the basics ad nauseum until they have mastery over it. Moreover, we teach their officers and sergeants about the basics so they can teach their guys.

The work is frustrating and very rewarding all on the same hand. We make friends quickly with the Afghans, but are sometimes frustrated by progress. What we have to realize is that progress isn't measured in American terms. We're not looking to create the next Afghan Ranger Battalion. We're looking to mentor Afghans who want to stand up for themselves and for their country. Here's what an Afghan soldier looks like


And here's what he's fighting for